New ideas for total defence: Comprehensive security in Finland and Estonia. OSW Report 2020-03-31. by Szymański, Piotr
NEW IDEAS FOR TOTAL DEFENCE
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
IN FINLAND AND ESTONIA
Piotr Szymański
NEW IDEAS FOR TOTAL DEFENCE
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 




© Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies
CONTENT EDITORS
Mateusz Gniazdowski, Wojciech Stanisławski, Justyna Gotkowska
EDITORS
Tomasz Strzelczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska
CO-OPERATION












Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland





 I. FROM TOTAL DEFENCE TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: 
THE NORDIC AND BALTIC REGION | 11
 II. FINLAND: THE LEADER IN COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY | 16
 1. Development of the comprehensive security system | 16
 2. Threats | 18
 3. Implementing a comprehensive security strategy:  
theory and practice | 20
 III. ESTONIA: THE PATH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY | 36
 1. Development of the comprehensive security system | 37
 2. Threats | 39











































































	• The  factor	binding	 the	Finnish	comprehensive	security	system	together	
is	 social	 capital.	Civil	‑military	cooperation	 is	well	‑developed	 in	Finland.	














‑term	endeavour,	and	 in	parallel	 to	other	defence	policy	priorities,	 such	





































	• From	the	military	perspective,	Host	Nation	Support	 remains	one	of	 the	
most	 important	capabilities	 for	Estonia.	For	 this	reason,	 in	recent	years,	
Tallinn	has	increased	expenditures	on	development	of	military	infrastruc‑





	• Finland’s	 and	 Estonia’s	 comprehensive	 security	 systems	 are	 not	 free	 of	
shortcomings.	 In  the	 case	 of	 Finland,	 this	 concerns	 strategic	 communi‑
cation,	which	on	several	occasions	has	been	undermined	by	miscommu‑















or	 postponement	 of	 implementation	 of	 some	 initiatives.	 Further	 short‑
falls	might	 be	 revealed	 by	 the	 coronavirus	 pandemic	 in	 both	 countries.	
In March 2020,	Finland	and	Estonia	announced	a state	of	emergency	and	









































ronment	 for	 the	 armed	 forces	 in	 the	 event	 of	war.	The  concept	 of	 compre‑
hensive	security	will	grow	in	importance,	due	to	the	lessons	learned	from	the	
coronavirus	pandemic	(for	instance	related	to	crisis	management,	uniformed	






















view	 of	 national	 security.	 The  capacity	 to	 deal	 with	 threats	 and	 crises	 is	
sym	bolised	by	the	 	Finnish	word	sisu	(a word	which	is	gaining	in	 	popularity	
inter	nationally),	 meaning	 ‘strength	 of	 will	 and	 endurance’.	 On  the	 other	
hand,	 Estonia	 began	 to	 build	 its	 own	 comprehensive	 security	 system	 rela‑
tively	recently	(sometimes	from	scratch),	in	around 2008.	The Estonian	case	
can	therefore	illustrate	the	challenges	and	difficulties	 involved	in	 introduc‑
ing	 a  comprehensive	 approach	 to	national	 security.	 The neologism	 	kerksus,	

















I. FROM TOTAL DEFENCE TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: 
















of	 ‘total	defence’	 (given	the	negative	connotations	with	 totalitarianism	and	
total	war).	One	sign	of	these	changes	was	the	Final	Act	of	the	Conference	on	
Security	and	Co	‑operation	in	Europe	(the Helsinki	Accords,	1975).	In addition	
to	a political	and	military	dimension,	 it	 also	encompassed	economic	 issues,	
environmental	 protection,	 or	 human	 rights.	 When	 the	 Cold	War	 came	 to	
an end,	the	concept	of	total	defence	was	gradually	expanded	to	include	crisis	
management,	non	‑military	threats,	and	peacetime	challenges	for	the	country	











‘Estonia’s	comprehensive	approach	to	national	defence:	origins	and	dilemmas’,	Journal of Baltic Secu-
rity,	2018,	no. 4(2),	pp. 1–13.













individual	 citizens.4	Unlike	 total	 defence,	 comprehensive	 security	 is	 a  con‑
tinuous	endeavour,	implemented	not	only	during	armed	conflict.
Comprehensive	 security	 is	 a  broad	 concept	 that	 encompasses	 the	 issues	 of	
	crisis	management,	 civil	 defence,	 and	 resilience.	This	 terminology	 is	 often	





















an	enemy’s	operational	purposes,	 irregular	warfare,	 and	 support	 from	var‑
ious	 state	 structures	 for	 the	armed	 forces.10	NATO	requires	 its	members	 to	
strengthen	resilience	to	aggression	under	art. 3	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty.	
4	 T. Jermalavičius,	P. Pernik,	M. Hurt,	H. Breitenbauch,	P. Järvenpää,	Comprehensive Security and Inte-
grated Defence: Challenges of implementing whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches,	Inter‑
national	Centre	for	Defence	and	Security,	12.02.2014,	pp. 85–87,	icds.ee.
5	 Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007,	prawo.sejm.gov.pl.
6	 Crisis management,	NATO,	27.02.2018,	www.nato.int;	Crisis management and Response,	EEAS,	15.06.2016,	
eeas.europa.eu.
7	 Obrona cywilna obecnie,	Obrona	Cywilna	Kraju,	www.ock.gov.pl.
8	 Civil preparedness,	NATO,	7.06.2018,	www.nato.int.
9	 EU Civil Protection Mechanism,	European	Commission,	25.07.2019,	ec.europa.eu.






















































































13	 Comprehensive National Defence in Latvia,	Ministry	of	Defence	of	the	Republic	of	Latvia,	23.08.2018,	
www.mod.gov.lv.
14	 National Defence Strategy,	Ministry	of	Defence	of	the	Republic	of	Estonia,	2011,	www.kaitseministee‑
rium.ee.




ful	security	environment.	See	National Security Concept 2017,	Ministry	of	Defence	of	 the	Republic	
of Estonia,	2017,	www.kaitseministeerium.ee.
16	 Defence Agreement 2005–2009,	Danish	Ministry	of	Defence,	10.06.2004,	www.fmn.dk.













is	 a  combination	of	military	 and	 civil	 defence	 (civil	 support	 for	 the	 armed	
forces,	protection	of	the	population,	and	functioning	of	society	in	crucial	areas	
























18	 The Swedish Defence Bill 2016–2020,	Government	Offices	of	Sweden,	8.05.2015,	www.government.se.
19	 Swedish Defence Commission presents report on total defence concept and civil defence,	 Government	
Offices	of	Sweden,	20.12.2017,	www.government.se.
20	 Exercise Trident Juncture 2018 (TRJE18): facts and information,	 Norwegian	 Armed	 Forces,	 2018,	
www.forsvaret.no.
21	 Support and Cooperation: A description of the total defence in Norway,	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	
Norwegian	Ministry	of	Justice	and	Public	Security,	2018,	www.regjeringen.no.
22	 Government’s Defence Report,	Prime	Minister’s	Office	Publications 7/2017,	Helsinki 2017,	www.def‑
min.fi.


































1. Development of the comprehensive security system







24	 J. Nylund,	Sisu: The Finnish Art of Courage,	London 2018;	J. Adamczewski,	M. Obrębska,	‘Sisu –	emocja	
kulturowa,	schemat	poznawczy	czy	słowo	klucz	do	tożsamości	Finów?’,	Annales Universitatis Mariae 
Curie -Skłodowska,	2018,	vol. 31(4),	pp. 51–63.
25	 A. Kivi,	Siedmiu Braci,	Poznań 1977.
26	 M. Aaltola,	T.  Juntunen,	 ‘Nordic	Model	Meets	Resilience –	Finnish	Strategy	for	Societal	Security’	
[in:] M. Aaltola,	B. Kuznetsov,	A. Sprūds,	E. Vizgunova	(eds.),	Societal Security in the Baltic Sea Region: 




















population.	 Among	 the	 non	‑military	 aspects	 of	 total	 defence,	 the	 greatest	
















lenges	and	threats	 (relating	for	example	 to	 the	 functioning	of	 the	 financial	
sector	and	public	services,	environmental	protection,	terrorism,	cyber	‑security,	
and	security	of	supply).	Thus	there	was	greater	focus	on	non	‑military	aspects	







trine.	P. Visuri,	Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine 1945–1985,	 ‘Finnish	Defence	Studies 1’,	War	
College,	Helsinki 1990,	pp. 30–34,	www.core.ac.uk;	R. Penttilä,	Finland’s search for security…,	op. cit.,	
pp. 89–92.





























































































power	plant	accident	remains	at	the	same	level.	National Risk Assessment,	op. cit.



















3. Implementing a comprehensive security strategy:  
theory and practice































36	 Security Strategy for Society…,	op. cit.
37	 T. Jermalavičius,	P. Pernik,	M. Hurt,	H. Breitenbauch,	P. Järvenpää,	Comprehensive Security and Inte-











































































as	 a  platform	 for	 strengthening	 military	 cooperation	 with	 European	 part‑
ners,	because	it	is	not	a member	of	NATO	(which	remains	the	most	important	
security	organisation	in	the	Euro	‑Atlantic	area).42	Finally,	from	the	long	‑term	
41	 Franco-Finnish statement on European defence,	 French	 Ministry	 for	 Europe	 and	 Foreign	 Affairs,	
15.06.2016,	www.diplomatie.gouv.fr;	Prime Minister Juha Sipilä: Developing the EU’s defence dimension 
is in Finland’s interest,	Prime	Minister’s	Office,	7.06.2017,	www.vnk.fi.
42	 Although	 Finland	 is	 not	 seeking	NATO	membership,	 it	 is	 developing	 close	military	 cooperation	
with	the	organisation.	It participates	in	NATO	exercises	and	operations,	contributes	to	the	NATO	












































Improving resilience to hybrid threats








J.  Gotkowska,	 P.  Szymański,	Between co-operation and membership. Sweden and Finland’s relations 
with NATO,	OSW,	Warsaw 2017,	www.osw.waw.pl.

















































46	 Sustainable Europe – Sustainable Future,	Finland’s	Presidency	Programme,	Presidency	of	the	Council	
of	the	European	Union,	www.eu2019.fi.
47	 Common action to counter hybrid threats,	Finland’s	Presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	






















Finland	maintains	 a  reserve	 army	 focused	 on	 territorial	 defence.	Military	

























49	 WIN/Gallup International’s global survey shows three in five willing to fight for their country,	 Gallup	
	International,	7.05.2015,	www.gallup‑international.bg.
50	 P.  Szymański,	With Russia right across the border. Finland’s security policy,	 OSW,	 Warsaw  2018,	
www.osw.waw.pl.






























































D. Internal security.	This	 is	 the	most	complex	area	of	 the	comprehensive	
security	strategy,	encompassing	highly	diverse	tasks –	from	combating	organ‑
ised	 crime	 to	preventing	 the	proliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction.	
























land,	 new	 shelters	 are	 continually	 under	 construction,	 and	 the	 exist‑
ing	ones	are	being	upgraded.	Evacuation	plans	are	also	being	reviewed	
(including	necessary	exercises)	and	cooperation	with	businesses	is	being	
56	 Security Strategy for Society…,	op. cit.
57	 Civil	 defence	 involves	 the	 fire	brigade	 and	 rescue	and	medical	 services.	Civil defence protects the 
 civilian population,	Ministry	of	the	Interior	of	Finland,	www.valtioneuvosto.fi.

















































































debate	on	 the	 issue	of	employees	of	 the	uniformed	services	who	have	dual	
citizenship.	Ultimately,	the	ban	on	employment	of	people	with	dual	citizen‑
ship –	due	to	fear	of	infiltration	by	Russia –	was	only	introduced	in	the	armed	





to	national	 security	 (due	 to	 the	possibility	of	disruption	of	mobilisation).67	





65	 Powers of the Finnish Border Guard to intervene in hybrid threats to be strengthened,	Finnish	Govern‑
ment,	10.01.2019,	www.valtioneuvosto.fi.







































These	developments	 are	part	 of	 a  greater	 scheme	 to	 reform	 the	SUPO,	











70	 Civilian Intelligence Act to improve Finland’s national security,	Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior	 of	 Finland,	
11.03.2019,	www.intermin.fi.
71	 New powers of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO),	Finnish	Security	and	Intelligence	Ser‑
vice,	www.supo.fi.












E. The economy, infrastructure and security of supply.	This	area	of	com‑
prehensive	security	strategy	relates	mainly	to	a range	of	security	of	supply	




























73	 Government Decision on the Objectives of Security of Supply (1048/2018),	National	Emergency	Supply	
Agency,	www.huoltovarmuuskeskus.fi.
74	 M. Aaltola,	 J. Käpylä,	H. Mikkola,	T. Behr,	Towards the Geopolitics of Flows: Implications for Finland,	
‘FIIA	Report 40’,	Finnish	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	9.06.2014,	www.fiia.fi.
75	 Security of Supplies in Finland: Objectives,	National	Emergency	Supply	Agency,	www.nesa.fi.
76	 Funding and Legislation,	National	Emergency	Supply	Agency,	www.nesa.fi.




















supply	 of	 peat	 for	 the	purpose	 of	 producing	 energy	 and	heat	 in	 a  cri‑















came	 to	 light	 in 2013.	An  investigation	revealed	 that	a Russia	‑linked	group	
Turla	was	behind	 an	 advanced	hacking	 operation,	which	 intercepted	 Finn‑
ish	Ministry	 for	 Foreign	Affairs	 communications	 for	 around	 three	 years.80	
Since	that	time,	Finland	has	adopted	a Cyber	Security	Strategy	(2013)	and	has	





































of	education	 for	children	and	young	people.	 In  this	 section	of	comprehen‑
sive	security,	compared	to	the	other	six,	regional	and	local	authorities	play	
a greater	role.
VALVE exercises and restoring power supplies


















Security Strategy for Society…,	op. cit.








































actors	 (for	 example	 the	 Russian	 information	 operations)	 and	 by	 non	‑state	
organisations	(terrorist	or	radical	anti	‑immigration	groups).	Monitoring	and	
countering	disinformation	is	the	responsibility	of	a special	team	of	experts	












































88	 M.  Lessenski,	Common Sense Wanted: Resilience to ‘Post-Truth’ and its Predictors in the New Media 












III. ESTONIA: THE PATH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
After	restoration	of	its	independence,	Estonia	perceived	NATO	membership	





of	 total	 defence	 and	 territorial	 defence,	 promoting	 voluntary	 involvement	
in	national	defence	 (Kaitseliit,	 the	Defence	League	with	 female	section	and	
youth	sections	for	boys	and	girls)	or	introduction	of	defence	courses	(Estonian	
National	Defence	Courses)	to	strengthen	civil	‑military	cooperation.89	The idea	







































1. Development of the comprehensive security system
In  the  1990s,	 Estonia	 focused	 on	 being	 admitted	 to	 NATO	 and	 building	
an independent	defence	capability,	in	particular	reconstruction	of	its	armed	
forces.	While	 the	principle	of	 total	defence	was	 incorporated	 into	Estonia’s	
defence	doctrine,	it	soon	proved	insufficient.	Due	to	the	bitter	experiences	of	
2007–200891,	it	was	expanded	to	include	the	concept	of	comprehensive	secu‑
rity.	At  that	 time,	Russia	 demonstrated	not	 only	 its	willingness	 to	 use	 con‑
ventional	military	force	against	its	neighbours	(Georgia),	but	also	to	employ	









plementing	 an	 integrated	 security	 strategy.	 The  vulnerabilities	 included:	
a shortage	in	financing,	gaps	in	civil	‑military	communication,	lack	of	common	












d’état	 in	Tallinn	 in  1924.	M. Maigre,	Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and 
Recom mendations for NATO,	German	Marshall	Fund,	12.02.2015,	www.gmfus.org.
93	 National Security Concept of Estonia,	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Estonia,	 12.05.2010,	
www.kaitseministeerium.ee.















security	concept	 in	 its	 initial	stage.	The Government	Office’s	role	 in	coordi‑
nation	and	oversight	of	the	comprehensive	security	system	was	strengthened	





















95	 The  coordination of national security and defence management,	 Government	 Office	 of	 Estonia,	
www.riigikantselei.ee.
96	 The Government	Security	Committee	 is	made	up	of	 the	prime	minister	and	heads	of	 the	 foreign,	




98	 Strategic communication,	 Government	 Office	 of	 Estonia,	 www.valitsus.ee;	 Government Communi-
cation Handbook,	 Government	Office	 of	 Estonia,	 2017,	www.valitsus.ee;	The  government approved 































Risk	assessments	by	 the	Ministry	of	 the	 Interior	apply	meanwhile	 to	emer‑
gency	situations	and	crisis	management.	In this	respect,	until	recently,	Estonia	







102	 International Security and Estonia,	Estonian	Foreign	Intelligence,	2019,	www.valisluureamet.ee.



































military	 defence,	 international	 action,	 internal	 security,	 continuous	 oper‑
ation	of	 the	state	and	society,	and	psychological	defence.104	Two	long	‑term	
documents	are	key	to	implementing	the	principle	of	comprehensive	defence.	
These	 are	 the	 National	 Defence	 Development	 Plan	 for	 2017–2026	 (RKAK),	




A. Military defence.	 There	 is	 political	 consensus	 in	Estonia	 regarding	de‑
fence	policy.	The armed	forces	are	guaranteed	steady	financing	of	 just	over	
2%	of GDP.	During	the	financial	crisis	of	2009–2014,	Estonia,	despite	having	
smaller	 economy,	 maintained	 higher	 defence	 spending	 than	 Lithuania	 or	
	Latvia.106	The Estonian	defence	model	is	based	on	a reserve	army	with	small	
regular	 component	 (one	 fully	professional	 combat	battalion)	 and	on	volun‑
tary	 engagement	 (territorial	 defence	 provided	 by	 the	Defence	 League).	 Fol‑
lowing	mobilisation,	 the	 armed	 forces	 wartime	 strength	 is	 approximately	
103	 Including	extreme	weather,	mass	influx	of	refugees,	flooding,	fire,	traffic	accidents,	mass	rioting,	
epidemics,	cyber	‑incidents,	radiological	or	chemical	accidents,	environmental	contamination,	mass	
poisoning,	a nuclear	accident.	Risk Management Capabilities: Estonia,	European	Union	Civil	Protection,	
2016,	www.ec.europa.eu.
104	 National Security Concept,	op. cit.
105	 In  the	case	of	NATO	this	concerns	 for	 instance	 implementation	of	 the	Civil	Emergency	Planning	
Committee	guidelines	(civil	preparedness	requirements).
106	 Estonia’s	total	defence	spending	in	this	period	came	to	USD 2.316 bn,	while	for	Latvia	it	was	1.548 bn	





































than	 70%	 of	 the	 reservists	 called‑up	were	mobilised	 and	manned	 the	







108	 Estonian Military Defence 2026,	Ministry	of	Defence	of	the	Republic	of	Estonia,	www.kaitseministee‑
rium.ee.





























each	 rotation	 of	 the	NATO	battalion	‑size	 battlegroup	 and	BAP	detachment	
is	an opportunity	for	civilian	and	military	structures	to	practice	HNS	tasks.	
For this	reason,	in	recent	years,	Estonia	has	simplified	military	mobility	pro‑









110	 T. Jermalavičius,	P. Pernik,	M. Hurt,	H. Breitenbauch,	P. Järvenpää,	Comprehensive Security and Inte-
grated Defence…,	op. cit.
111	 Government approved new Host Nation Support concept,	Ministry	of	Defence	of	the	Republic	of	Estonia,	
23.12.2010,	www.kaitseminister.net.
112	 Under	the	Estonian	International	Military	Co	‑operation	Act,	the	government	has	an	obligation	to	
maintain	a database	of	 resources	necessary	 to	provide	HNS.	M. Attrill,	 ‘NATO	Force	 Integration	









































































Cyber ‑security in Estonia’s international activity
Estonia	is	promoting	its	expertise	in	cyber	‑security	in	the	international	











institution	of	 this	kind	 in	NATO	(recently	 further	countries	expressed	
an  interest	 in	 joining).	An example	of	 the	CCDCOE’s	activity	 is	organi‑
sation	of	NATO’s	most	advanced	cyber	‑defence	exercises,	Locked	Shields.	
This  has	 been	 held	 annually	 since  2010,	 and	 is	 attended	 by	 approxi‑




of Defence	organised	at  that	 time	the	first	cyber	‑defence	exercises	 for	
118	 Cybersecurity Strategy 2019–2022,	Ministry	 of	 Economic	 Affairs	 and	 Communications	 of	 Estonia,	
www.mkm.ee.
119	 The global	 interest	 in	Estonia’s	model	 can	be	 seen	by	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 2015	 the	prime	minister	 of	
Japan	Shinzō	Abe	became	an	e‑resident	of	Estonia.
120	 Locked Shields,	 NATO	 Cooperative	 Cyber	 Defence	 Centre	 of	 Excellence,	 www.ccdcoe.org;	NATO 


















D. Internal security.	 Estonia’s	 priorities	 in	 this	 field	 are	 stipulated	 in	 the	
Internal	 Security	 Development	 Plan	 for	 2015–2020	 (STAK).	 In  countering	
threats	to	Estonia’s	public	order,	it	stresses	the	importance	of:	ensuring	that	
institutions	responsible	for	internal	security	are	staffed	with	professional	and	


























123	 Siseturvalisuse arengukava 2015–2020,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Estonia,	www.valitsus.ee.
124	 Compared	with	585 cases	in 2009.	Internal security 2016,	Ministry	of	the	Interior	of	Estonia,	www.is‑	
suu.com.












The Defence League as a military and internal security actor
The Defence	League	(Kaitseliit)	plays	an	important	role	in	the	Estonian	
comprehensive	security	system.	This	voluntary	territorial	defence	organi‑
















































E. Continuous operation of the state and society.	A comprehensive	approach	
to	security	requires	the	government	and	providers	of	vital	public	services	to	



















Back to civil defence


















































F. Psychological defence.	 In  the	world	 of	 social	media	 and	 new	 tools	 for	
manipulation,	psychological	defence	is	becoming	more	important.	Estonia	is	
131	 Elanikkonnakaitse Kontseptsioon,	Riigikantselei,	2018,	www.riigikantselei.ee.






























text	of	 the	 society’s	 resilience	and	cohesion.	 It points	out	 the	 link	between	
proper	 functioning	 of	 the	 state	 and	 society	 in	 normal	 circumstances	 and	

















years	 and	 is	 the	 country’s	 largest	mass	 event	 featuring	 choirs,	 dance	 troupes,	 and	 thousands	 of	
spectators.











































137	 E.  Lange	‑Ionatamišvili,	 I.  Bērziņa,	 M.  Cepurītis,	 D.  Kaljula,	 I.  Juurvee,	 Russia’s Footprint in the 
 Nordic-Baltic Information Environment,	NATO	Strategic	Communications	Centre	of	Excellence,	2018,	
www.stratcomcoe.org.
138	 S. Tambur,	‘Estonia	launches	its	first	Russian‑language	TV	channel’,	ERR,	28.09.2015,	news.err.ee.
















obsolete.	General	 conscription,	 exercises	 for	 reservists,	 the	maintaining	of	
emergency	stockpiles,	or	drilling	out	more	shelters	in	an	age	of	expeditionary	























increasingly	 important.141	 The  key	 issues	 in	 this	 respect	 are	 prevention	 of	





141	 A. Hyvönen,	T.  Juntunen,	H. Mikkola,	 J. Käpylä,	H. Gustafsberg,	M. Nyman,	T. Rättilä,	 S. Virta,	













































of	 crisis	management	 issues	 among	 officials	 and	 the	 public.	 The  improve‑
ment	in	cooperation	and	better	mutual	understanding	between	the	civil	and	












































































pandemic	will	 bring	new	 lessons	 learned	 and	 recommendations	 related	 to	








143	 Public Opinion and National Defence,	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Estonia,	 29.05.2019,	
www.kaitseministeerium.ee.
